The Humanitarian Situation:

January 2005: The UN International Commission of Inquiry estimated 700-2000 villages in Darfur were destroyed. It determined that the government of Sudan and its Janjaweed militia were responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but the Commission could not find evidence of a policy of genocide.

April 2005: The Coalition for International Justice, working with researchers from Northwestern University and the University of Toronto, announced that the death toll in Darfur could be as high as 400,000, with an estimated 140,000 killed as a direct result of Janjaweed and GoS attacks, and 250,000 deaths from disease, starvation and other causes.

March 2006: UNHCR cut 44% of its operations in Darfur because of heightened security risks.

October 2006: The World Food Programme reported that it could not reach as many as 350,000 people in August 2006, with dire consequences for the conflict-affected population, 70% of whom they considered to be food insecure.

10 November 2006: The Norwegian Refugee Council, whose operations had been repeatedly suspended by the GoS, closed down its relief operations in Darfur, a move that affected 300,000 IDPs. The NRC had just issued a report on 80 incidents of rape in Kalma camp in South Darfur. Five days later, the International Organisation for Migration was expelled from South Darfur State for allegedly inciting the 2.5 million people in camps not to return home.

15 December 2006: Oxfam International warned that a third of Darfur’s conflict-affected population was out of bounds to aid agencies. More than three years into the conflict in Darfur, two million people have been had to flee their home to live in IDP camps in Darfur and 200,000 refugees from Darfur live in camps in neighbouring Chad.

17 January 2007: Fourteen UN agencies operating in Darfur warned that unless the security situation improved, they would no longer be able to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need. In a statement, they explained: “Access to people in need in December 2006 was the worst since April 2004 … In the last six months alone, more than 250,000 people have been displaced by fighting, many of them fleeing for the second or third time”. They added that humanitarian workers were increasingly being targeted: “Twelve relief workers have been killed in the past six months - more than in the previous two years combined. In the last six months, 30 NGO and UN compounds were directly attacked by armed groups.  More than 400 humanitarian workers have been forced to relocate 31 times from different locations throughout the three Darfur states”.

March 2007: Violence spills into neighbouring Chad as the Janjaweed cross the border and kill an estimated 400 civilians. The governments of Sudan and Chad blamed one another of backing rebels in each other’s countries.
Attacks on two border towns of Tiera and Marena increased the number of displaced Darfuris and death toll as survivors that fled the village attacks died in its wake from exhaustion and dehydration.

June 2007: Oxfam pulled out of Gereida - the largest refugee camp in Darfur in order to protect their staff as had they increasingly had become the targets for violence.

July 2007: The spiralling atrocities in Darfur led the British Red Cross to partner with other aid agencies under the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) in order to widen its appeal for funding its operations.
Sima Simar, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Sudan received allegations of mass human rights violations during her visit to northern Darfur including cases of harassment, rape and sexual violence, torture, extortion, abduction and killings.

8 October 2007: OCHA reported an estimated 160,000 newly displaced people since January 2007. The number of civilian IDPs in Darfur rose to 2.2 million.  Nearly two-thirds of Darfur's population, 4.2 million people were now thought to be dependent on relief aid.

December 2007: Humanitarian aid workers are increasingly targeted by rebel groups. Oxfam field workers report: "Our staff are being targeted on a daily basis. They are being shot, robbed, beaten and abducted. We can't use the roads, we have to fly to the majority of our programme locations. In terms of actual violence against aid workers, seven were killed in October."

February 2008: Government perpetrated violence against civilians in Darfur dramatically increases, reminiscent of the scale of violence seen in 2003 and 2004. In west Darfur a new GoS bombing campaign forced 13,000 Sudanese to flee into remote parts of the southern border of neighbouring Chad.  In the last week of February the UNHCR estimated that there 3,000 new Sudanese refugees. The west Darfur region is rendered practically empty, with only around 20,000 inhabitants.

March 2008: The UNHCR has to relocate Chadian camps further inland into Chad as the camps on the border were subject to intense cross-border violence. Among the relocated were the 13,000 Sudanese refugees that fled from west Darfur in February 2008, along with internally displaced Chadians.

Some UN aid workers withdrew from eastern Chad because of the cross-border bombing, and the intentional bombing of refugee camps.  The WFP announced that 50 trucks have been high-jacked since January 2008, and 23 drivers remained missing and unaccounted for. The WFP warned that due to the severe lack of funding from donors, and if the security situation in the region fails to improve then it will be forced to completely stop its Humanitarian Air Service.

28 March 2008: Former U.N. humanitarian chief Jan Egeland announced that he estimates that tens of thousands more people have died in Darfur since he made his first estimate of 200,000 dead in 2006.  He suggested that 400,000 dead is closer to the truth, especially in light of the recent upsurge in violence.

Early Warning and reporting on the Crisis in Darfur:

3 February 1997: the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Sudan, Gaspar Biro, warned of serious intertribal clashes in West Darfur between the Rizeighat, Missirya and other Arab nomadic tribes, on the one hand, and the Zaghawa and Masalit tribes on the other.

March 2004: UN coordinator Mukesh Kapila called Darfur “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis” and compared it to Rwanda

5 October 2005: the Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Mendez, warned of the alarming security situation in Darfur, as well as the lack of accountability. He recommended that the Security Council and the AU elaborate a strategy to neutralize the Janjaweed in the absence of GoS cooperation.

January, April and October 2006: Throughout 2006, the UN Panel of Experts reported that the GoS continued to violate the arms embargo and carry out offensive military overflights, and that it was still supporting the Janjaweed with vehicles and weapons. The Panel recommended that the embargo be extended to the whole of Sudan, and that a verification component (end-use certification) be made mandatory. The travel ban and the financial sanctions remained unenforced as of December 2006.

October and November 2006: The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour released two reports condemning government support for attacks carried out on civilian populations in Darfur. The attacks clearly took place with Government blessing and tangible backing, such as the support of the Sudanese armed forces in the form of vehicles and weapons.

Throughout 2005 and 2006, UN independent human rights experts warned of the deteriorating human rights situation in Sudan as a whole, and Darfur in particular. The reports condemned the Government of Sudan’s ruthless and disproportionate attacks on civilians in Darfur, its continued support for the Janjaweed militia, its reluctance to prosecute the perpetrators of human rights abuses – especially the security services, and the dramatic increase in sexual violence and rape. The experts also condemned the lack of efforts on the Government’s side to implement both the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Darfur Peace Agreement.

Sudan and Chad:

February 2007: Increased violence between rebel groups across the Chad-Sudan border reignited efforts by presidents of both nations to end border violence at a conference in Libya.
After Andre, an eastern town in Chad was seized by a coalition of four rebel groups the Chadian government rejected the UN’s plans to stage troops on its eastern border.

May 2007: Presidents Deby and al-Bashir sign a Saudi-brokered reconciliation in order for both sides to cooperate with the UN to stabilize the region.

September 2007: UN Security Council authorised the deployment of EU peacekeeping force and a contribution of UN police to Chad in order to help protect civilians affected by the ensuing Sudan-Chad border violence.

October 2007: Chad and four Chadian rebel groups based in Sudan signed a “definitive peace accord” to end the continued fighting. A week after signing it rebel groups had abandoned the accord.

January 2008: The EU authorised EUFOR (European Union Force Chad/CAR) and deployed 3,700 peacekeepers to eastern Chad under a chapter VII mandate to protect IDPs, refugees and help secure aid operations.

February 2008: Sudan analyst Alex de Waal writes: "The three armed groups involved in the latest attack [in the Chadian capital N'Djamena] were all extensively armed by Sudanese security, which has the clear intent of cutting off the support that Deby is giving to Darfur rebels, especially (JEM), which has recently been on the offensive in Darfur."

3-5 February 2008: Rebel groups, allegedly backed by the GoS, attempted to seize N’djamena in a coup. Within two days the rebels withdraw from the capital stating that they will honour a ceasefire if Chadian President Deby steps down.
The UN Security Council gave France the go-ahead to provide Chad with foreign aid and the UN urged the international community to support President Deby.

March 2008: Chadian rebel groups refused to recognise the peace agreement signed between Chad and Sudan.   The deal was brokered by the Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, the EU and AU, and aimed to mitigate and eliminate border violence.

The African Union (AU) Response:

June 2004: The African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed in Darfur to monitor and report on the April 2004 N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Sudan and rebels groups in Darfur.

October 2004: The AMIS mandate was extended to include the protection of “civilians encountered who are under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity”, and the creation of a secure environment throughout Darfur. With 2,900 troops on the ground, AMIS was tasked with monitoring and verifying an area the size of France.

May 2005: An AU-led assessment mission recommended enhancing the AMIS mission from 3.300 to 7,700 personnel. The AU declined to strengthen its mandate. The ICG estimates 12,000-15,000 troops are needed. General Romeo Dallaire (UN commander in Rwanda) estimates 40,000 are needed to protect civilians. Only 7000 AU peacekeepers are in place as of January 2007.

10 March 2006: An agreement was signed in Addis Ababa between the GoS and AU to extend the AU mission in Darfur until 30th of September 2006, and then allow AMIS to merge into a larger UN force.

1-2 June 2006: At its Summit in Banjul, the African Union decided to extend AMIS’s mandate for a further six months, despite warnings by Alpha Konare, the African Union Commission Chairman, that the AU had neither the capacity nor the resources to do so. International diplomats submitted to Khartoum’s wishes and abandoned plans for a transition to UN peacekeeping.

20 September 2006: the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) extended its mission in Darfur until 31 December, with logistical and material support from the UN. The AUPSC also approved a new concept of operations for AMIS, increasing the troop ceiling from 7,000 to11,000. As of January 2007, additional troops have yet to be sent to Darfur.

30 November 2006: At the AU Peace and Security meeting, the AU extended AMIS’s mandate for a further six months. The Council also endorsed an AU-UN hybrid force, but it conceded ground to the Government of Sudan by stating that the UN would only have a supportive role.

29 April 2007: The Tripoli Consensus recognises the value of regional troop presence to help address the root causes of the conflict in Darfur, and urges coordination and cooperation for the AU-UN.

1 July 2007: Darfur was discussed during the AU summit in Ghana but no distinct resolutions were agreed upon to help end the atrocities in the region.

30 September 2007: 12 peacekeepers are killed when the AMIS base was attacked by rebels. This was the largest attack against the African Mission.

November 2007: 10 AU troops were killed in northern Darfur as the 7,000 deployed troops operating with a limited mandate attempted to mitigate violence.

The United Nations (UN) response:

30 July 2004: UN Security Council Resolution 1556 demanded that the Government of Sudan disarm the Janjaweed and bring them to justice, and called for unobstructed humanitarian access, all within 30 days. Two and a half years later, the Government of Sudan still sponsors the Janjaweed and continues to impede the delivery of humanitarian aid in Darfur.

18 September 2004: UN Security Council 1564 mandated the International Commission of Inquiry into Darfur to investigate human rights violations in Darfur, determine whether acts of genocide have occurred, and identify the perpetrators of the violations.

29 March 2005: UN Security Council Resolution 1591 extended its existing arms embargo to include to the government of Sudan. It also set up a Sanctions Committee and a Panel of Experts to monitor the arms embargo and the implementation of targeted financial and travel-related sanctions.

31 March 2005: UN Security Council Resolution 1593 referred Darfur to the International Criminal Court. The Prosecutor opened an investigation of events in Darfur in June 2005 (51 sealed indictments; trials expected in February 2007).

25 April 2006: UN Security Council Resolution 1672 named four persons against whom targeted travel-related and financial sanctions should be implemented: Major General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan (Sudanese Armed Forces), Sheikh Musa Hilal (Chief of the Jalul tribe in North Darfur), Adam Yacub Shant (SLA commander), Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri (National Movement for Reform and Development Field Commander). Moral equivalency triumphs yet again as equal blame is assigned to all parties, despite the overriding responsibility of the Government of Sudan for atrocities committed in Darfur.

31 August 2006: UN Security Council Resolution 1706 created the mandate for an approximately 23,000-strong peacekeeping force in Darfur. The transition from AU to UN was seen as a gradual process, beginning with a UN assistance package for AMIS. The resolution fell short of a real breakthrough though, as it required Sudan’s consent.

16 November 2006: At a meeting in Addis Ababa, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan unveiled his three-step plan for a AU-UN hybrid force for Darfur. Annan’s plan envisaged a $21 million support package to the AU, with the deployment of several hundred soldiers and police, and finally a 17,000-strong hybrid force, under UN command and control, to conduct peacekeeping duties in Darfur.

February 2007: The UN Human Rights Council deployed a mission to Darfur seeking to interview Darfuris afflicted by the genocidal violence, but it was denied access to the region by the GoS.  In a visit to Khartoum “the AU and UN envoys for Sudan stress the need of security and delivery of humanitarian aid to the Darfur displaced”.

April 2007: President al-Bashir accepted the expansion of the AU-UN hybrid force but not to its full capacity of 20,000 troops as earlier agreed.
UNMIS stated that a ceasefire must be established in Darfur in order to send the heavy support package (HSP) from the UN to the AU forces. The HSP is part of a three-pronged phase of peacekeeping deployment to Darfur to establish the AU-UN hybrid force.

A 'confidential' UN report released information about the GoS flying military equipment into Darfur disguised as AU or UN aircrafts, in violation of Security Council sanctions.

The European Union (EU) Response:

September 2004: The European Parliament declared that the actions of the Sudanese Government in Darfur were ‘tantamount to genocide’. By including the qualifier that Khartoum’s actions were virtually genocide, the EU puts itself on the record as deploring the crimes, yet avoided the contractual obligation under the UN Genocide Convention to act.

16-17 October 2006: At the EU External Relations Council Meeting, foreign ministers emphasized that “a UN operation is the only realistic option for a sustainable, long-term peacekeeping operation in Darfur”. Despite Sudan’s defiant resistance to UN deployment in Darfur, the Council reaffirmed its decision not to impose sanctions on Khartoum.

March 2007: An EU resolution which aimed to facilitate compensation for victims; urge the UN General Assembly to convince companies affiliated with the Sudanese regime to withdraw their businesses from Sudan; and address issues regarding the Sudanese government’s failed ability to protect its civilians, failed to make much progress.
The EU claims to be at the forefront of funding the AU and support for implementation of the DPA and CPA, human rights inquiries, and for UN Special Envoys to ensure compliance with Security Council Resolutions (totalling €1 billion euros).

March 2008: To date, the EU has deployed 100 EU personnel to Sudan as military support for AMIS. The EU has coordinated airlifts for over 2,000 AU personnel. It has also heavily contributed to AMIS funding (totalling €435 million). These funds are also earmarked to fund UNAMID transition costs.

February 2008: European security force in Chad (EUFOR) deployed a force of 3,700 troops to Chad in to protect N’djamena and Chadian President Deby from an attempted rebel coup.

March 2008: A EUFOR soldier was shot and killed in an exchange of fire with the Sudanese military when his truck accidentally crossed the border of Chad into Sudan. French President Sarkozy condemned the killing, declaring the exchange of fire with the Sudanese military as “deliberate and disproportionate”.
EU divests shares from the Chinese Oil firm PetroChina/CNPC due to its affiliation with and bankrolling of the GoS and the genocide in Darfur after pressure from humanitarian activists and MEPs.

The Arab League Response:

March 2006: The Arab League held its annual Summit in Khartoum, further reassuring the National Congress Party that it would receive full diplomatic support from its Arab allies.

The United States (US) Response:

June 2004: US Congress described Darfur as ‘genocide’.

September 2004: On the basis of a report conducted jointly by the US State Department, the Coalition of International Justice and USAID, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell announces that “Genocide has been committed in Darfur, and the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility …no new action is dictated by this determination.”

21 April 2005: US Senate unanimously passed Darfur Accountability Act, spearheaded by Senator Jon Corzine. The Act condemned genocide, called for sanctions and the appointment of a presidential envoy to Darfur.

21 April 2005: The Sudanese head of intelligence, (thought to be accused of war crimes by the UN inquiry), was brought to Washington to brief the CIA on terrorism.

November 2005: US Senate cut $50m from aid to the African Union mission to Darfur.

September 2006: At a UN General Assembly Meeting in New York, George W. Bush declared that "if the Sudanese government does not approve this peacekeeping force quickly, the United Nations must act".

17 September 2006: At the occasion of the Global Day for Darfur, President Bush joined calls for the UN to stop Darfur slaughter. In the Sunday Times, he claimed “I can understand the desperation people feel for women pulled out of these refugee centres and raped. And now is the time to act”.

May 2007: President Bush announced further economic sanctions as well as support for the UNAMID peacekeeping force.
Bush also ordered the US Department of Treasury to block the assets of three influential Sudanese individuals accused of taking part in Sudan’s genocidal campaign, including sanctioning 31 companies owned or controlled by the GoS.

September 2007: The US pledged support for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance in Darfur: $4 billion towards operations for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and development, providing 25% of funding for the UN-AU hybrid force, construction and maintenance for 34 bases in Darfur for the AU peacekeepers, 40,000 tons of aid food (monthly).

February 2008: Steven Spielberg resigns as artistic director to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, stating : “I have made repeated efforts to encourage the Chinese government to use its unique influence to bring safety and stability to the Darfur region of Sudan. Although some progress has been made along the way, most notably, the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769, the situation in Darfur continues to worsen and the violence continues to accelerate. With this in mind, I find that my conscience will not allow me to continue with business as usual. At this point, my time and energy must be spent not on Olympic ceremonies, but on doing all I can to help bring an end to the unspeakable crimes against humanity that continue to be committed in Darfur.” A great deal of media attention on Darfur is generated as a result.

The United Kingdom (UK) Response:

March 2005: The House of Commons International Development Select Committee took the unusual step of reprimanding DFID Secretary of State Hilary Benn for downplaying the scale of the disaster in Darfur.

June 2005: The Africa minister Lord Triesman reiterated earlier parliamentary answers when he said the UK remained “concerned” about the situation in Darfur; “We continue to make it clear to the government of Sudan that perpetrators must be brought to justice,” and “we regularly press the government of Sudan [to uphold its obligations].” When asked about friendly relations between London and Khartoum, his predecessor, Chris Mullin, said, “I’m afraid that, in diplomacy, it is sometimes necessary to meet governments with whom we do not see eye to eye on all matters.”

March and August 2006: The head of Sudanese Intelligence, Salah Abdallah Gosh was granted a visa to the UK for “urgent medical reasons treatment”, according to the FCO. The US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was in London during both visits.

8 December 2006: In a statement on the second Day for Darfur on 11 January, Hilary Benn reiterated the FCO and DFID position that all parties to the conflict held equal responsibility for the crisis in Darfur: “the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups must end the fighting and commit to finding a political solution (…). The continued fighting by the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups, particularly the National Redemption Front, is putting this work in jeopardy and is threatening yet more lives”.

13 December 2006: In the Financial Times, Tony Blair declared his support for a no-fly zone in Darfur and called for “tougher action”. He warned that “If rapid progress is not made, we will need to consider alternative approaches, with international partners”.

16 January 2007: At Commons question time, William Hague urged Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett to spell out what actions the British government intended to take in view of the worsening situation on the ground in Darfur. Beckett answered: “There is, I think, quite a short window of opportunity for the government of Sudan to show that this time they are sincere in being willing to move forward with the UN and the African Union". She added  "If they are not able to do so, then I think consideration of what action the international community can take - whether through sanctions of whatever -will have to come to the fore again, which is not  what anybody wants.”

July 2007: Gordon Brown states that France and Britain will work together to help resolve the “great humanitarian disaster of our generation” as both countries pledge to work with the UN in producing a quick deployment of an AU-UN force.

In addition to leading international efforts to help gain UN consensus in supporting AMIS ahead of the AU-UN joint mission, the UK claims to continually lobby international counterparts (AU, Russia and China) in pressuring the GoS to uphold all aspects of the Addis Ababa agreements brokered by Kofi Annan in November 2006.

March 2008: Gordon Brown called for a faster deployment of UN peacekeepers to Darfur and stronger sanctions against GoS.
He also urged the GoS to enter cooperative peace talks with rebel militias to end the atrocious human suffering in Darfur, declaring the state of the situation as “humanitarian tragedy of colossal proportions where the world must act…We must strengthen our sanctions against the Sudanese government. We should have military sanctions for the whole of Sudan.” Yet Brown did not support the imposition of a no-fly zone over Darfur, citing it would be "impractical."

Brown’s position was supported by opposition MPs and by French President Nicholas Sarkozy vowing to redouble their efforts to stabilise the Darfur region.

13 April 2008: On the Global Day for Darfur PM Brown announced that Britain would be willing to hold peace talks in order to end the conflict in Darfur. "Britain is willing to invite all parties to London for talks to see if there is a way to make some progress." Brown stated that he was frustrated at the "appalling situation and the slow progress" in brokering peace talks.  He promised to raise the issues of of deploying peacekeepers in Darfur during talks with US President Bush and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon during his visit to America in mid-April.

China’s Response:

China opposes economic, military and political sanctions on the Sudanese government: “On several occasions China and Russia, keen to protect oil and arms deals, have sabotaged UN Security Council attempts to impose harsh sanctions on Sudan for its actions in Darfur.”

April 2007: China became the target for Darfuri activists worldwide, including international NGOs and a growing number of celebrities and Olympic athletes due to it’s unique relationship with Khartoum and monopoly over 70% of Sudanese oil which directly and indirectly facilitates the GoS’s genocidal policy.

May 2007: In response to mounting international attention and pressure China appoints Liu Guijin, an African expert, as a Special Envoy for Sudan.

October 2007: The JEM kidnapped Chinese oil workers in the Defra oil field in Sudan. JEM commander Abdel Aziz el-Nur Ashr stated: “This is a message to China and Chinese oil companies to stop helping the government with their war in Darfur.” After seizing three army vehicles and killing 20 soldiers, JEM spokesman Ali al-Wafi Bashar said: “We want all oil companies to leave Sudan within one week.”

November 2007: The JEM banned Chinese forces from entering Sudan by JEM stating they would allow peacekeepers from any country but China. JEM also advised that Beijing pull out the 130 Chinese peacekeeping engineers that recently arrived in Darfur to pave the way for the anticipated UN/AU forces.

February/March 2008: China urged Sudan to be “cooperative” and compromise over matters involving Darfur, such as accepting deployment of UNAMID peacekeepers.  China urged the West to pressure Darfuri rebels to stop perpetrating violence.

UN-AU Peacekeeping Force:

31 July 2007: UN Resolution 1769 is approved by the UN Security Council authorising the 26,000 AU-UN hybrid force (UNAMID). UNAMID’s deployment garnered consensual cooperation by the Sudanese Government and is intended to take over the AU peacekeeping mission (AMIS) which has been operating in Darfur since 2004.

31 August 2007: In the first of many problems regarding Resolution 1769 the first deadline for UNAMID troop commitment and deployment is missed.  In anticipation of future difficulties meeting deadlines set by Resolution 1769, the UN and EU travel to eastern Chad to explore possibilities of deploying a UN-EU “civilian protection force” on the border.
President Deby agreed to the presence of the force.

November 2007: President al-Bashir reaffirms his rejection of non-African troops in the composition of the UNAMID force. In addition to the GoS’s obstructing UNAMID’s deployment, the JEM issued public statements warning that China is banned from entering Sudan whilst demanding that Beijing withdraw the 130 Chinese peacekeepers that entered Darfur to pave the way for the UN-AU hybrid force.

December 2007: Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch detailed the ways in which the GoS has purposely caused UNAMID to fail:

-          By not approving non-African troops,

-          By not approving night flights and insistence on the right to block communications

-          By not allocating land for UNAMID bases,

-          By not agreeing on resources for UNAMID.

31 December 2007: UNAMID missed its operational deadline. Drastically lacking funding and equipment, such as the 24 helicopters requested for UNAMID’s sufficient deployment, the mission’s operation appeared bleak as by 1 January 2008 only 9,000 of the agreed 26,000 troops are stationed in Darfur.

February 2008: Violent clashes on the Chad-Sudan border made the AU’s military hand over to the UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping force difficult. Due to the lack of troops deployed on the ground, inadequate funds and proper equipment, such as helicopters, many observers on the ground are pessimistic about UNAMID’s ability to change the situation on the ground.  One observer said: "We don't see an immediate end to this unless UNAMID is properly resourced and the international community supports ongoing peace negotiations so that they are comprehensive and representative of the community in Darfur which is very diverse."

March 2008: Russia pledged several desert mobile helicopters to the UNAMID force. They were added to helicopters given by Ethiopia and Bangladesh, yet UNAMID still required more helicopters.

Ethiopia and Egypt pledged troops to UNAMID during the AU Peace and Security Council meeting this month in Addis Ababa. Their contribution will include 5,000 Ethiopian troops and 2,100 Egyptian troops.

International Criminal Court (ICC):

February 2007: The International Criminal Court (ICC) completed its first case on Darfur as it appealed to the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue summonses (not mandated warrants) for two Sudanese individuals wanted for wars crimes. Ahmad Haroun - a Sudanese Government Minister involved in the Government of Sudan’s (GoS) initial Darfur policy in 2003 where the Janjaweed militias began attacking Darfuri civilians, and Ali Kushyb - a prominent leader of the Janjaweed.

2 May 2007: The ICC issued warranted arrests for Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushyb

3 May 2007: The Sudanese Government defied the ICC warrants as it repeatedly and publically refuses to extradite Harun and Kushyb.

September 2007: Sudanese Government appointed Ahmad Harun co-chair on the committee appointed to hear victims’ cases of human rights abuses in Darfur.

December 2007: ICC Prosecutor announced two new investigations into 1) individuals bearing the greatest responsibilities for the current crimes against humanity, and those assisting Harun, and 2) those responsible for attacks on AU and UN peacekeepers (including rebel factions).